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Abstract
Knowledge innovation depends on knowledge sharing. 
It is possible to exchange knowledge products between 
suppliers and demanders in knowledge market within 
enterprise. After the analysis of how to price knowledge 
product, the bargain mechanism is researched respectively 
under complete information and incomplete information. 
Furthermore, with the analysis of defects of independent 
transaction, the effective method for knowledge 
transferring and sharing within enterprise is put forward.
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INTRODUCTION
During recent years, there is an ongoing hot topic in 
academic and business circles that is how to conduct 
knowledge management effectively. Many large 
enterprises do not hesitate to pay large sum of money for 
the practice of knowledge management to improve their 
innovative abilities and accelerate the market reactive 
speed through the formation of knowledge sharing 
mechanism. The premise of knowledge sharing is that the 
knowledge owners contribute their knowledge to others. 
On one hand, knowledge owners could gain interests 
or advantages, so they do not want to contribute their 
knowledge easily; on the other hand, in the daily work 
and research activities, the complexity of information 
and limitation of personal knowledge restrict the personal 
processing power, so people can not master all knowledge 
they need, and this leads to the demand to obtain other’s 
knowledge, which forms the basis of knowledge market 
within enterprise.
Knowledge market transaction within enterprise is that 
demanders of knowledge master what they want through 
the deal with knowledge suppliers. Knowledge transaction 
is the foundation of knowledge sharing, and through 
the transaction, knowledge products can be transferred 
from suppliers to demanders. Knowledge products are 
divided into two types: explicit knowledge and implicit 
knowledge. However, the two kinds of knowledge 
transaction are different from each other during the actual 
transaction process. Usually, explicit knowledge can be 
transferred though only one deal, but the trade of implicit 
knowledge, from the discovery of knowledge to reach 
a deal and be transferred in the end, often needs several 
continuous processes.
According to the enterprise whether interpose the 
transaction of internal knowledge market, the means 
of knowledge exchange can be divided into two types: 
independent transaction and management participatory 
t r ansac t ion(Ying  & Qian ,  2010) .  Independen t 
transaction means the trade of knowledge products 
is conducted among individuals independently, and 
enterprise’s managers are not involved in. Management 
participatory transaction means the enterprise provides 
convenient conditions for knowledge transaction and 
favorable incentive to propel knowledge transfer among 
individuals, or between individuals and the enterprise, so 
as to realize the process of knowledge transaction.
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1 .   B A R G A I N I N G  A N A LY S I S  O F 
INDEPENDENT TRANSACTION UNDER 
COMPLETE INFORMATION
First of all, according to the characters of knowledge 
product, we discuss a simple case. Assume that, for a 
certain knowledge product to trade, supply and demand 
market takes on bilateral monopoly characteristics. 
It means there is only one buyer and one seller in the 
market, so the competition relationship between the 
demander and supplier will no longer be considered. It 
is supposed that the supply cost of knowledge product 
is c, and utility of knowledge product is v. When c ≥ v, 
it means knowledge product does not have exchange 
value; whenc < v, it is considered that the transaction 
price p [ ],c v∈  is pareto optimality from the point of view 
of society, so the profits of buyer and seller are v-p and 
p-c, and the total trade surplus is v-c. The game process 
of pricing knowledge product is actually a carving up 
process for the sales income v-c of knowledge product 
for the buyer and seller. Following Rubinstein’s modeling 
method (Song, 2005), we will analyze the bargaining 
process and the transaction price which is decided by 
sub-game refined equilibrium. Above all, we have to 
make sure that bargaining rules are as follows: the 
seller bids firstly, and then the buyer decides to refuse 
or accept the price, if the buyer accepts the price, the 
bargaining process will be over; if rejects, then goes into 
the next round, where the buyer offer a price, and the 
seller decides whether or not to accept it, if rejected, then 
goes into the next round again, such a cycle over and 
over again. Each bid to give a price x , and it means the 
share that the seller gains from sales benefits, so (1-x) 
represents buyer’s share in the total surplus. Suppose that 
parameter δ is the discount rate, when 0 < δ < 1, discount 
rates of the buyer and the seller are δb and δs, when the 
game ends in the t -th period, the present value that the 
seller shares the surplus is ys=δs
t-1xt , and the present value 
which the buyer shares the surplus is yb=δb
t-1(1-xt), so 
the bigger is t, and the smaller is the discount profits. 
According to the research of Rubbinstein (Rubinstein, 
1982), taking turns to offer in a game indefinitely, 
the only sub-game refined Nash equilibrium result is 
provided directly as follows:
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Now discuss the economic meaning of above model 
based on equation (1). The greater the parameter δ is, the 
more patient the participants have; conversely, the smaller 
the parameter δ is, the little patience the participants have, 
which means the participants urgently look forward to an 
early end to the bargaining process.
According to 
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It is clear that the share of seller is in proportion to 
his patience, and it is in inverse proportion to the buyer’s 
patience. When the buyer has no patience, the seller 
gets the entire surplus; however, when the seller has no 
patience, the buyer gets share surplus. When δs=δb, which 
means both sides have the same patience, the seller’s share 
is simplified to x*=1/(1+δ); if both sides have complete 
patience at present, that is x*=1/2, which means both 
sides share the surplus equally. So the share allocation of 
knowledge product transaction is based on the patience 
of the buyer and seller, and the urgency of the buyer 
and seller affects the efficiency of knowledge product 
transaction. More urgent the buyer is, more surplus the 
seller could gain, meanwhile, it could improve the trading 
efficiency. Likewise, the reverse is also true for the seller.
2 .   B A R G A I N I N G  A N A LY S I S  O F 
INDEPENDENT TRANSACTION UNDER 
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Under complete information situation, the buyer and 
seller bargain for the distribution of sales revenue, which 
is decided by discount factors of both sides. However, 
in practice, the buyer does not understand the cost that 
the seller paid for during the process of creating the 
knowledge product; at the same time, the seller also does 
not familiar with the purpose and utility that the buyer 
buy the knowledge product. Especially, if a long-term 
business relationship can not be set up between the buyer 
and the seller, the assumption that cost and utility are 
considered as public knowledge can not be established. 
The pricing model under incomplete information we are 
going to talk about is to turn knowledge cost and utility 
into private information, which is mainly based on the 
both-offer model of Chatterjee and Samuelson (Rubinstein, 
1982; Chatterjee & Samuelson (1983), and the both-offer 
auction model of Zhang Weiying (Zhang, 2007).
Assuming that supply cost c  of knowledge product is 
private information of the supplier, and c~U[0,a] is public 
information; knowledge utility v is private information 
of the demander, and v~U[0,b] is public information. 
Bids of the seller and the buyer are ps, pb, and then both 
sides make sure a sharing ratio k of pb-ps through infinite 
times bargaining, here k has the same meaning with x* in 
equation(1). According to equation (2):
( ) (1 )s b s b sp p p p k kp k p= + − = + −
In this Bayesian game, the seller’s asking price ps is 
the function of c, and the buyer’s asking price pb is the 
function of v, so there is a Bayesian equilibrium, namely 
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strategic combination ( ps
*(c),p*b(v)). This game has many 
Bayesian equilibriums, in order to limit the number of 
Bayesian equilibriums we assume that both the buyer 
and the seller are to take linear bidding strategies, so it is 
given that:
ps(c)=αs+βsc,c~U [0,a]
pb(v)=αb+βbv,v~U [0,b]
The optimal solution of the buyer is the solution of 
buyer’s objective function:
{ } { }( ) ( ) ( )max (1 ) ( ) Pr
b
b s c s c b b s cp
v kp k E p p p ob p p − + − ≤ ≥ 
Here, ( ) ( )( )b v s b vE p p p≤  is the seller’s asking price 
expected by the buyer, which is under the condition 
that the given seller’s asking price is lower than the 
buyer’s offer.
The optimal solution of the seller is the solution of 
seller’s objective function:
{ } { }( ) ( ) ( )max (1 ) ( ) Pr
s
s b v b v s b v sp
k p kE p p p c ob p p − + ≥ − ≥ 
Here, ( ) ( )( )b v s b vE p p p≤  is the buyer’s asking price 
expected by the seller, which is under the condition that the 
given seller’s asking price is lower than the buyer’s offer.
Because c is uniform distribution on [0,a], so ps is 
uniform distribution on [αs,αs+βsa]. Therefore, we get the 
following equation:
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Substituted into the buyer’s objective function: 
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Similarly, v is uniform distribution on [0,b], so bp is 
uniform distribution on [αb,αb+βbb], so:
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Substituted into the seller’s objective function: 
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Based on ( ) , ( )s s s b b bp c c p v vα β α β= + = + , solve the 
two first-order equations (3) and (4), and the Bayesian 
equilibrium is given as follows:
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Based on the discussion and analysis for the above 
models, it is clear that:
The sales revenue distribution of the buyer and the 
seller is decided by discount factors of both sides. When 
discount factors of the buyer and the seller are δb and δs, 
then 
bs
bk
δδ
δ
−
−
=
1
1
.
When the buyer has no patience at all, namely δb=0, 
k=1, and the Bayesian equilibrium is ps=c, pb=v / 2. When 
pb > ps, the transaction price is p=pb=v/2.
When the buyer has complete patience (δb=1), and 
the seller’s patience is relatively not enough (δs <1), 
and then k=0. At this time, the Bayesian equilibrium 
is ps=(b+c)/2,pb=v, and then the transaction price is 
p=ps=(b+c)/2.
When the buyer and the seller have the same and 
infinite patience (δb=δs=δ=1), k=1/2. Now the Bayesian 
equilibrium is: 1 2 1 2,
4 3 12 3s b
p b c p b v= + = +
The transaction price is: 
1 1 1( ) ( )
2 6 3s b
p p p b v c= + = + +
3.  THE DEFECTS OF INDEPENDENT 
TRANSACTION
Bargaining is the most direct and effective way of 
reaching a consensus and sharing information among 
the participants, and the final price of the knowledge 
product can be obtained from the analysis of above 
models. However, there are a lot of obstacles in the actual 
operation process of independent knowledge product 
transaction. In addition, the above models also have some 
defects in the concrete practice process, and it is mainly 
manifested in the following aspects:
Firstly, according to the both-offer model of Chatterjee 
and Samuelson, the concrete price of knowledge product 
can be finally determined through the bargaining 
mechanism, but we found the above determinate price of 
knowledge product only had theoretical guidance function 
and short of concrete value. According to the final 
conclusion of the models, it is clear that the final price 
of knowledge product depends on discount factors of the 
buyer and seller, and it also means patience degree, cost 
of knowledge product c and utility v . But in the actual 
operation process of knowledge product transaction, 
the seller usually cannot completely make sure his 
production cost of knowledge product. Because different 
sellers’ personal intellectual level, the knowledge content 
and education experience are different, the production 
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costs are different for the knowledge products with the 
same function, which makes the supply cost of private 
information c difficult to be quantified. Meanwhile, the 
utility of the knowledge product is hard to confirm 
because of different purchasing purpose and use value 
after purchase, so v  in the models is also difficult to 
determine. Additionally, because of the unpredictability 
of the buyer and seller, the discount factors of both sides 
are constantly changing and difficult to determine during 
the process of negotiation. So eventually the above 
models only have the theoretical guidance function, 
which can help people understand the bargaining 
strategies of both sides and know the price of knowledge 
product under the determinate c  and v , but there is 
poor maneuverability in the actual operation process of 
knowledge product transaction.
Secondly, due to the participants’s some bad attempts, 
it maybe provide false information in the bargaining 
process, or maybe doubt the other party’s bargaining 
motive and information, and thus for speculation or fraud, 
which may cause the loss of potential gains from other 
participants, and make every participant not be willing 
to firstly publish the offer  (Zhang, 2007). Such as the 
seller has a minimum sales price ls, and the buyer has a 
maximum purchasing price hb, at the beginning, if the 
buyer provides the purchase price hb > ls, according to the 
general situation, the seller will not directly accept the 
buyer’s offer, in most cases, even if the trader has been 
satisfied with the bid, he usually continues to strive for a 
better price. So, at this time, the seller may refuse hb, and 
modify his lowest sale price ls into hb, which would cause 
the loss of potential profits hb - ls. Similarly, when the seller 
bids firstly, the buyer may modify his private information 
secretly. It will cause the income loss and make the 
bargaining process longer, and sometimes even failure.
Thirdly, in the real bargaining process, people often 
mutually quote the price, and according to the first price 
to revise their next offer, in order to achieve that the 
knowledge products could trade successful eventually. 
But in bargaining process there are loopholes because 
of public bids, which would make some participants 
to exploit an advantage and damage the interests of 
rightful traders. Especially, if a participant’s real purpose 
of trading knowledge product is not to deal with his 
opponent, but only wants to collect more accurate product 
price information through the negotiation process, so that 
he can be in a better position during the real negotiation 
process in the future. Such as the following special case, 
the seller S based on sincerity, but buyer B tries to get 
more exact information of the product price. Assume that 
the seller has a minimum sales price ls=120 and the most 
ideal sales price hs=200; and the buyer’s highest bid price 
hb=210, the most ideal purchasing price lb=130. In the 
fourth stage of bargaining process, the buyer quits because 
the seller has no sincerity. The bargaining situation is 
shown in Table 1: 
Table 1
Bargaining Sequence
Stage The buyer B’s offer The seller S’s offer
1 100 200
2 110 190
3 115 170
4 120 170
From Table 1 we can see that the buyer’s last offer 
120 is not higher than his ideal price 130 before the 
bargaining is over, and his biding sequence does not 
match his private information, but he still gains a 
lot from the bargaining process. Based on S’s last 
offer 170, B can get a very important conclusion that 
he mostly needs to pay 170 to buy this knowledge 
product .  According to  th is  informat ion,  B wi l l 
drop his highest purchasing price hb  from 210 to 
170 or even lower. Thereby, the seller will be in a 
disadvantage situation in the next bargaining process 
because of the information leakage, which would 
harm the seller’s normal rights and interests.
CONCLUSION
Based on above analysis, it could not be analyzed whether 
the knowledge product is valuable, how much value it has, 
and how to price it simply according to the cost plus and 
utility of the knowledge product. Considering respective 
demand, credibility, knowledge distance, urgency and 
cognitive difference, there should be a price interval 
accepted by both sides instead of a single price based on 
the cost and utility of the knowledge product, especially 
within the enterprises, and both sides had better negotiate 
with the participation of the manager who can help make 
a reasonable price interval to promote the transaction, 
transfer and sharing of knowledge products. 
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